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ABSTRACT 
Malwares are becoming persistent by creating full- edged variants of the same or different family. 
Malwares belonging to same family share same characteristics in their functionality of spreading 
infections into the victim computer. These similar characteristics among malware families can be taken as 
a measure for creating a solution that can help in the detection of the malware belonging to particular 
family. In our approach we have taken the advantage of detecting these malware families by creating the 
database of these characteristics in the form of n-grams of API sequences. We use various similarity score 
methods and also extract multiple API sequences to analyze malware effectively. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Malwares authors are applying various techniques like obfuscation, dead code insertion, creation of 
variants of one family for escaping the detection process. We focus on unpacked binaries for 
implementation of our approach. If a binary is packed with UPX (Ultimate Packer for eXececutables), 
then binary can be unpacked using UPX unpacker itself [15]. Otherwise if binary is packed with some 
other packer then that binary is executed in virtual environment and it's unpacking is done. After this step, 
open source BeaEngine library [16] is used to disassemble the executable's text section (figure 3). 
Disassembly is a process of decoding mnemonic codes into its equivalent assembly instructions. 
Algorithms applied for static dis-assembly falls in two categories. 
1. Linear disassembly: In this disassembly starts at the first byte of .text section and instructions are de-
coded one after other.   
2. Recursive disassembly: In this disassembly starts at the first byte of .text section and disassembly 
continues until a branch instruction is encountered. For a branch instruction control is transferred to 
the ad-dress in branch instruction and address of the next instruction is stored in stack. During 
disassembly if return instruction is encountered then control re-turns to the stored previous 
instruction's EIP. We use the BeaEngine Disassembler Library which utilizes recursive method of 
disassembly.  
A Control Flow graph (CFG) of an executable is generated after disassembly. A Control Flow graph 
shows the flow of execution in the form of basic blocks (nodes) and edges. A basic block is a set of 
instructions without any branch or control transfer instruction in between. Edges are created between two 
blocks on the basis of branch or control transfer instruction. There are two types of control transfer 
instructions. 
1. Conditional Control Flow Instruction This instruction transfers control to other instruction based on 
the condition being true or false. For example, JNE = jump if not equal.  
 
2. Unconditional Control Flow Instruction This instruction includes instructions like JMP and call. JMP 
instruction transfers the control at a different instruction and control never returns to the same 
instruction. CALL instruction transfers the control to the instruction found in the called address and 
control returns to the calling instruction when a return instruction is encountered while executing 
instructions.  
API database is created which includes Win32 soft-ware development kit's API as well as driver develop-
ment kit's API. All the API's names are resolved in dis-assembly process by using Name or Hint array and 
Import Address Table present in PE structure [14]. CFG generation module generates Control Flow 
Graph from the Disassembly done by BeaEngine. All the Conditional and Unconditional jumps are taken 
care to de-ne a directed graph from the disassembly. The Directed Graph nodes contain the Win32 API 
call which is the execution sequence of the executable disassembled. Depth First Search algorithm is 
applied for traversal of all the nodes through which Multiple API call sequences are retrieved. We prefer 
depth first traversal over breadth first traversal because former will be able to build a path while going 
down the depth. How-ever BFS will traverse all nodes at one level before going to next level and hence 
limit its capability to build the path automatically during traversal. To analyze features of API sequences, 
we used N-gram technique and calculated 2-gram, 3-gram and 4-gram sequences from the obtained API 
sequences. Using a large training dataset, Malware N-Gram database and Benign N-Gram database are 
generated for all gram factors. We have used coefficients like Dice coefficient, Cosine coefficients and 
Tversky Index for calculating the similarity between the N-Gram databases generated from the training 
database and the N-Grams obtained from the file under analysis. These similarity measures help in 
deciding whether the executable under analysis is malicious or benign. Formulae for dice, Tversky and 
cosine coefficients are shown in equations 1, 2, 3 respectively. X and Y are two sets in which we have to 
determine the similarity. 
𝐷 =  
2 |𝑋 ∩𝑌|
|𝑋|+|𝑌|
    (Eq.1) 
𝑇 =  
|𝑋∩𝑌|
|𝑋|∩|𝑌|+𝛼|𝑋−𝑌|+ 𝛽|𝑌−𝑋|
  (Eq. 2) 
Where α and β are min and max values of |X-Y| and |Y-X|. 
𝐶 =
2 |𝑋∩𝑌|
√𝑋+|𝑋∩𝑌|∗(𝑌+|𝑋∩𝑌|)
   (Eq.3) 
If a file is found malicious then there are many classes under which that particular malicious file be-longs 
too. Characteristics or traits present inside the malicious file always help in depicting the class of that 
particular malicious file. We have classified the malware into different malware classes i.e. Trojan, Back-
door, Viruses, Adware, and Worms. So, the database of each malware class is a subset to Malware N-
Gram database. If the file is found malicious then we can also tell the user the name of malware class in 
which it belongs. 
1.1 Problems in Evaluation of Packed Executable Detectors 
Unfortunately there is no simple way to deterministically find out whether a binary is packed or not [19]. 
We have to take multiple steps in evaluating packed binary detectors [20]. Many papers evaluate their 
packed executable detection approaches and post a true positive rate and false positive rate. But accuracy 
of these rates can be questioned as accuracy of data sets used is not validated. When data set is built by 
authors themselves by packing non packed executables with widely known packers, accuracy is trusted 
but approach has not been put to rigorous testing on real malware picked from internet [21][22]. When a 
data set is built by obtaining real malware samples, then we basically don't know which binaries are 
packed and which are not packed [17]. In this case accuracy cannot be trusted. We designed and 
implemented a packed executables detection approach based on dynamic analysis [23][24][25]. Our tool 
utilizes PIN tool for instrumentation [26]. When a packed binary unpacks itself then it should insert some 
decrypted code into program's address space and should execute the same. By utilizing PIN we have 
written a tool to trace down all the written address of a running program and if the program tries to 
execute from the same written address then we flag it as packed[27][28]. When the results obtained by 
using this approach were cross validated with the results obtained from Signature based approaches (e.g. 
PEiD)[29], we found many instances which were packed but could not be detected by dynamic analysis 
based approach. The problem is when we don't know exactly which binaries are packed, we cannot trust 
either static analysis based detection [30][31] or dynamic analysis based one. Hence we must first start 
with something trusted and extend the chain of trust. Michael St. Neitzel emphasizes the problems in 
packed executable detection testing [32] For example when a binary is flagged as non-packed even by 
dynamic analysis approach it may be due to binary did not execute in its full capability because of various 
dependency and checks. We propose a systematic methodology for evaluating packed executable 
detectors. The approach is shown in Figure 1. Here we list down involved steps. In first step we collect 
and divide executables on the basis of following two methods. a) Packed Binaries which are correctly 
detected by signature based approaches [29] and b) Packed Binaries which are not detected by signature 
based approaches but either packed program or packer itself is available. So, multiple binaries of this type 
will be collected. In second step, we develop a dynamic analysis based tool for detecting packed binaries. 
Now the set of binaries which is built in first step is fed to this tool to observe the capability of dynamic 
analysis based detection and these results can be crucial base for benchmarking output from next step. In 
third step, take a large dataset of binaries on which packed binary detectors has to be tested. These 
binaries now can be fed to dynamic analysis based tool for classifying packed and non-packed binaries. 
Moreover, detection must be applied for binaries which refused to run in their full capability. Hence 
binaries which are VM-aware and Debugging aware can be weeded out.  In last step, static analysis based 
detection tool can run on packed binaries which are declared as packed by our previous step. This 
Approach helps to build a validated data set resulting accurate detection rate. 
 
Figure 1: Proposed Approach for Evaluation of Packed Executable Detectors 
2. RELATED WORK 
Sung et al. [1] has introduced various obfuscation techniques that can be applied on malware samples and 
then malware signatures based on the API sequences are generated from these obfuscated binaries. New 
suspicious binaries are scanned with this newly created malware signature database. With the help of 
similarity measure like Euclidian distance and similarity functions like Cosine measure, extended Jaccard 
measure, and the Pearson correlation measure these suspicious binaries are classified as malicious or 
benign. Li et al. [2] has developed a PE parser for extracting API sequence and classified the PE as 
benign or malicious by using association rules. Association rules are generated based on OOA Fast FP-
Growth algorithm which is based on support and confidence functions. Similarly Ban et al. [3] has 
proposed inserting hooks into the running program and extracting the critical APIs that are categorized on 
the basis of their functionality. Eskandari and Hashemi [4] have also proposed a feature selection 
algorithm by assuming called APIs on the CFG. Similarly Zhao [5] has designed a virus detection model 
based on feature selection in Control Flow Graph and generating classifiers according to specific machine 
learning algorithms. Yang [6] has extended the support for detection using structural features generated 
from CFG by identifying the packed binaries with the help of entropy. These packed binaries are 
unpacked in dynamic environment. Similarly Canzanese et al. [7] has measured the kernel APIs call and 
sequence of API call made by running the binaries in virtual environment and classifying them as 
malicious or benign by applying random forest classifier. Bonfante et al. [8] has generated malware 
signatures by constructing the control ow graph based on opcode like JMP, JCC, CALL and RET instructions 
forming the sequence in CFG. Mithun et al. [9] has demonstrated the correct and effective API usage by 
mining the API partial order. Watters et al. [10] proposed behavior analysis using different behavior 
groups of API call features extracted from IDA Pro tool. Similar approach is followed by Veeramani et al. 
[11] by doing unpacking of known packed binaries with respective packers and extracting API sequence 
of unpacked binaries with the help of IDA Pro. Super-vised learning based SVM classifier has classified 
binaries into benign or malicious. Wasaki et al. [12] has created their own recursive disassembler and 
constructed control ow graph to extract API sequence and used dice coefficient to calculate similarity 
between malware samples. Parvez, et al. [13] has used ether virtualization for unpacking the packed 
binaries and applied various machine learning algorithms on API n-gram extracted from the disassembly 
of the unpacked binary. 
3. OUR APPROACH 
 
Figure 2: Fitting Packed Binary Detection in overall approach 
 
 Figure 3: Detection Approach 
 
3.1 Resolving API in Disassembly 
After disassembly API calls made in the disassembly are resolved by using Name/Hint array and Import 
Address Table present in PE structure. For e.g. CALL DWORD PTR [145234]. In above instruction call 
address i.e. 145234 comprises of base address for the PE i.e. 0x140000 and the thunk value 5234. This 
thunk value is matched against the thunk value present in Import Address Table read from Portable 
Executable. If a match is found then the Function Name present in Import Address Table is assigned to 
this Instruction. API database is used which contains API's from Win32 software development kit as well 
as driver development kit for further restricting the Function name resolved in the disassembly. 
3.2 Control Flow Graph generation 
In control ow graph generation for portable executables conditional and unconditional instructions are 
used for creating edges between the nodes in CFG. When a program is running and a conditional 
instruction is encountered then it follows single path depending on the condition being true or false. But 
during static analysis dynamic behavior of the program cannot be deter-mined. Hence, while generating 
CFG whenever any conditional instruction is encountered then both paths are taken for the creation of 
nodes. Address of entry point found in the text section of a PE is taken as the starting point for the 
generation of CFG. From the entry point all instructions are taken one by one and placed inside node until 
a branch instruction is encountered. 
 
Conditional instruction 
If conditional branch instruction is encountered then either that branch will be taken or the program will 
follow the normal ow by executing the next EIP. If branch is taken then address present in the instruction 
is matched with the disassembled instruction's EIP and different node is formed. Next EIP of the branch 
instruction is stored in the stack. Whenever control re-turns from the branch instruction then EIP stored in 
the stack is popped for creation of nodes. 
 
Unconditional instruction 
If unconditional JMP instruction is encountered, then the address present in the jmp instruction is matched 
with disassembled instruction's EIP and the new node is formed. If address is not matched then CFG 
creation stops as for JMP instructions execution never return to next EIP. But if the encountered 
instruction is call instruction then the called address is matched with dis-assembled instruction's EIP and a 
new node is formed. The control is again transferred to the next EIP of the calling instruction whenever a 
return instruction is encountered. In this way all the nodes along with links are created in the CFG. Nodes 
having conditional branch instruction like jne or unconditional branch instruction like call will have two 
adjacent nodes linked with them. For nodes with unconditional branch instruction like JMP will have only 
one node linked with them as for them there is only one path. There also exist instructions such as CALL 
RAX, JMP EAX etc. where a register value is used to provide jump address to instruction. This approach 
will require some sort of emulation or symbolic execution to calculate dynamic value in the operand. 
These kinds of cases are not currently handled in our work. 
 
3.3 Extracting Multiple-API sequences using Depth-First traversal 
Depth First Traversal is used for traversing all the linked nodes till return instruction is found and then 
back-tracking is done. For backtracking in CFG the address stored in the stack is popped and traversal is 
started from that address. We are using vector for storing the entire path traversed before backtracking. 
All the nodes in CFG will have adjacent nodes which are marked as Not Visited. So, one of the adjacent 
nodes is taken during traversal and it is stored in vector and marked as visited. The other adjacent node's 
EIP is stored in the stack. Whenever a return instruction is encountered then the previously traversed path 
instructions which are stored in vector makes one path and traversal again starts from the previously 
stored adjacent node EIP. This procedure is followed until all the paths present in the CFG are traversed 
and stored in the vector. All the branch instruction traversed in the CFG which forms one of the paths is 
stored inside a vector. These paths also include the API calls made while creating the CFG and forms a 
sequence of API calls made in one of the many paths. 
 
3.4 Feature extraction 
N-gram sequence algorithm 
After extraction of multiple API sequences from the portable executable, n-gram technique is 
implemented for analyzing these API sequences. A large set of known malware is taken and divided into 
five major classes (Virus, Trojan, Backdoor, Adware and Worm). Later on n-grams are extracted from the 
API sequences obtained from these categories of malware dataset. Thus n-gram construction leads to five 
different malware n-gram databases. And one database for benign dataset is also constructed by taking a 
large set of benign les from windows system directory. 
 
Many malware detection approaches based on API sequence has extracted the API's from the executable 
and constructed n-grams from them. Later on they have applied some machine learning algorithm like 
random forest, Naive Bayes, J48 on them and provided the out-put as benign and malicious. In these 
kinds of approaches each API extracted from the API sequence is assigned some unique identifier as 
shown in table 1. For example, suppose API sequence extracted from a file is 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 
11, 12. For malicious file 3-grams is represented as shown below: 
{1, 2, 3, Malicious} 
{2, 3, 4, Malicious} 
{3, 4, 5, Malicious} 
{4, 5, 6, Malicious} 
{5, 6, 7, Malicious} 
{6, 7, 8, Malicious}  
{7, 8, 9, Malicious}  
{10, 11, 12, Malicious} 
 
At other places in the paper we show only a fraction of these n-grams (wherever required) to be concise.  
 
Table 1: Listing API Name and associated Unique Id 
API Name Unique Id API Name Unique Id 
ReadFile 1 GetProcAddress 7 
WriteFile 2 VirtualAlloc 8 
CloseFile 3 VirtualAllocEx 9 
OpenFile 4 FindFirstFile 10 
CreateFile 5 FindNextFile 11 
CreateProcess 6 LoadLibrary 12 
 
Similarly, 3-grams extracted from single benign file is represented as shown below: 
{1, 2, 3, Benign} 
{4, 5, 6, Benign} 
{7, 8, 9, Benign} 
{10, 11, 12, Benign} 
 
Later on training is done on these created 3-grams by Weka tool [18]. This type of dataset doesn't provide 
much accurate detection. As we can see from the table 2 we have taken 51 samples from Trojan-
Spy.Win32.Zbot class out of that 26 samples were used for training and 25 samples were used for testing. 
In 25 testing samples 6097 3-grams were extracted in which 2811 3-grams were detected and 3286 3-
grams were not detected by using random forest algorithm in Weka tool. Weka by default uses 10-fold 
cross validation. We are presenting a set based approach in which API sequence extracted from a file is 1, 
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 then for a malicious file 3-grams extracted are represented as shown below: 
{(1,2,3),(4,5,6),(7,8,9),(10,11,12), Malicious} 
Similarly, 3-grams extracted from a benign file are represented as shown below.  
{(1,2,3),(4,5,6),(7,8,9),(10,11,12), Benign} 
The results obtained by using this approach are rep-resented in table 3. We have taken 20 samples from 
Win32-Genome-Trojan malware class out of which 10 samples are used for training the model and 10 
samples are used for testing. By using random forest algorithm all the 10 samples used in testing are 
correctly identified by our set based approach for 3-grams. 
 Table 2: Table showing Results obtained from gram based approach: 
S. NO  
 
Malware Family Samples Count Training Sample 
Count 
Test Sample 
Count (n-gram 
extracted) 
Random Forest 
Algorithm 
D  ND 
1   Trojan-Spy.Win32.Zbot 51 26 25 (6097) 2811  3286 
2 Win32-Genome-Trojan 20 10 10 (13120)  13020 100 
3 Win32-Inject-Trojan 10 4 6 (684)  144 540 
4 Win32-Palevo-p2p-Worm 10 5 5 (938)  461 477 
5 Win32-ZAccess-Backdoor 22 11 11 (935)  67 868 
6 Win32-Agent-Trojan-Dropper 6 3 3 (331)  65 266 
Note  1 *D = Detected n-gram sequence, 
*ND = Not Detected n-gram sequence 
 
Similarity Coefficient 
Different Similarity coefficients are used to calculate the similarity between file under analysis and 
malware, benign n-gram databases. Similarity is calculated on the basis of gram sequences extracted from 
the file under analysis. If the similarity coefficient with malware API n-grams database is higher, it means 
sample file contains features similar to malware and the coefficient value tells to which category of 
malware class it belongs too. 
 
Table 3: Table showing Results obtained from set based approach 
S. 
NO  
 
Malware Family Samples Count Training Sample 
Count 
Test Sample 
Count (n-gram 
extracted) 
Random Forest 
Algorithm 
D ND 
1   Trojan-Spy.Win32.Zbot 51  26 25 17 8 
2 Win32-Genome-Trojan 20 10 10 10 0 
3 Win32-Inject-Trojan 10 4 6 1 5 
4 Win32-Palevo-p2p-Worm 10 5 5 1 4 
5 Win32-ZAccess-Backdoor 22 11 11 7 4 
6 Win32-Agent-Trojan-Dropper 6 3 3 2 1 
 
 
4 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
A large training dataset of 15000 malwares and 4000 benign PE les is collected. With the help of this 
dataset, we have built 2-gram, 3-gram and 4-gram databases of API sequences as our training database for 
five categories of malware classes and benign files. We have identified the malware classes by uploading 
those samples on virus total. These training n-gram databases are further used for testing and calculating 
the similarity between extracted API sequence n-gram from file under analysis and the database built. 
These similarity coefficients tell the file under analysis is more similar to malware indicating malware 
characteristics or similar to benign indicating benign characteristics. 
For testing we have taken 2340 samples for 2-grams, 4672 sample for 3-grams and 2416 samples for 4-
grams. By taking three similarity coefficient i.e. Dice, Tversky and cosine we have done comparison of 
the performance of these coefficient in detection of the malware. Results obtained from the given testing 
dataset are displayed in figure 4 and 5. Detection rate of 94.78% and false positive rate of 33.51% has 
been achieved by using 3-grams and dice coefficient. After this we have applied a cumulative approach 
for 3-grams with Dice coefficient.  
 
Figure 4: TPR for 2-grams, 3-grams and 4-grams 
 
 
Figure 5: FPR for 2-grams, 3-grams and 4-grams 
This approach comprises of four phases. In phase-0 we have taken training set of 12443 malwares and 
11561 benign and constructed the n-gram database. In phase-1 we have taken new 3500 malware 
samples and 3094 benign samples and per-formed the testing of the constructed database. By this 
detection rate of 92.00% has been achieved. Later on we have done cumulative learning by adding these 
samples in the previous training dataset thereby increasing the learning set to 15943 malicious samples 
and 14655 benign samples. In phase-2 new 3500 malware samples and 2767 benign samples are taken 
and testing is done on the database obtained from the phase-1 cumulative learning. By this detection rate 
of 94.04% is achieved. Again these samples are added into the database constructed from phase-1 
learning thereby making the over-all database comprising of 19443 malware samples and 17422 benign 
samples. To build these training sets, it required at least 1m per malware. While testing a given binary 
requires it requires around 3m per malware. 
 
In phase-3 similar approach is followed by taking new 3278 malware samples and 1689 benign 
samples and testing is done on the database obtained from phase-2 cumulative learning. Detection rate of 
95.06% is obtained by following this approach. In this phase also these samples are added into the 
database and now the database comprises of 22721 malicious samples and 19111 benign samples. Figure 
6 represents the cumulative approach for learning the database in respective phase-0, phase-1, phase-2and 
phase-3. At each phase test, we obtain malware set which is not detected and benign set which is wrongly 
detected. We add these misidentified les and prepare updated database for next phase. Our cumulative 
testing approach asserts the fact that the technique improves with more training data.  
 
Figure 6: Malware and benign dataset for cumulative testing and training 
Detection rate achieved in various phases in depicted in figure 7 and false positive rate achieved in 
various phases in depicted in figure 8. False positive rate can further be reduced by using more benign 
binaries to build training set. Every malware belongs to one malware family and share some traits of that 
family. For testing these traits similarity we have taken six malware families and per-formed phase wise 
learning by taking 1, 2 and 3 sample files from each of the malware families. The detection rate obtained 
by using this approach is depicted in table 4.  
 
Figure 7: Detection Rate in Phase I, II, III 
 
 
Figure 8: False Positive Rate in Phase I, II, III 
 
We can see from table 4 that when we take 1 sample from the respective malware family and test our 
samples for the similarity with that particular family then detection rate is bit lower. In comparison to that 
when sample count is increased to 3 file then detection is approx. 100% in three families. This gives the 
idea that malware belonging to one malware family shares approximate similar API sequences. 
Table 4: Detection rate based on 1, 2, 3 Files used as training dataset in Phase I Phase II and Phase III 
S. 
NO  
 
Malware Family Samples Count Phase  I 
1 Files 
Phase  II 
2 Files 
Phase  III 
3 Files 
1   Trojan-Spy.Win32.Zbot 51   21.56 %  52.94% 68.62% 
2 Win32-Genome-Trojan 20 100%   100% 100% 
3 Win32-Inject-Trojan 10 40.00%  90.00% 100 % 
4 Win32-Palevo-p2p-Worm 10 30.00%  60.00% 70.00% 
5 Win32-ZAccess-Backdoor 22 40.90%  59.09% 72.72% 
6 Win32-Agent-Trojan-Dropper 6 50.00%  83.34% 100% 
 
 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have presented the accuracy of the set based n-gram detection technique using multiple 
API's sequence. In our work we came out with a cumulative approach for testing and training our 
databases and hence improving the detection rate. We have also presented an approach that detects 
malware and its variant belonging to different classes. We see that our approach is very useful in 
detecting variants of one malware family. We also observe that some mathematical research to determine 
more efficient similarities can be taken up in future. 
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